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* Professor of Law, University of Florida.
My debt to theorists is acknowledged in the usual manner in the textual references and
footnotes that follow. I have more difficultly crediting the consumer credit counselors who first
interested me in the nature of their work. The casual conversations we had occurred before I
took interest in writing on this subject seriously enough to ascribe credit to particular individuals.
Rather than name some and omit others, I acknowledge my debt to them collectively. Though
much more concerned with analysis than detailed description of the work of credit counselors,
this work could not have been undertaken without the information they provided. I am indebted
to Durant Abemethy, president of the National Foundation for Consumer Credit, for the insights
and data he has generously provided. Rick Tuman, Executive Director of Consumer Credit
Counseling Services of Mid-Florida, has been a source of continuing assistance.
Full disclosure of my relationship with consumer credit counseling agencies, whose function
I evaluate in the pages that follow, requires that I note my participation, however slight, in a
successful effort to bring such an agency to my hometown, Gainesville, Florida. I believe my
former services as a volunteer on the Gainesville Advisory Board of Consumer Credit
Counseling Services of Mid-Florida, Inc. have had no perceptible effect on the detachment I
have endeavored to bring to this work. The issues present in debt adjustment kindled my
interests in the work of consumer credit counseling agencies and not the other way around.
Acknowledgment of greater feats of volunteerism are due Scott Collins and Todd Watson,
who have provided assistance by reading and commenting on earlier versions of the book from
which this essay is derived, Games Creditors Play: Collecting from Overextended Consumers
(1997). I have heeded much of their advice, but I followed my own beliefs when they differed
from those who kindly offered comments. The usual disclaimer is therefore in order the errors
remaining in this work are my own.
Games Creditors Play was a work in progress over several years. Wendy Cousins, David
Leon, Stephanie McClain, Henry Sorenson, Karen White and the library staffs of the University
of Florida College of Law and Hastings College of the Law of the University of California
provided research assistance when it was most needed. In addition to doing research, Wendy
Cousins and Karen White provided valuable editorial and format revision assistance for earlier
versions of Games Creditors Play. Helen Wheldon brought her skills in word processing to bear
in preparing the final manuscripts of my book and this essay, allaying my fears that the glitches
couldn't be removed.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem of Counterproductive Collection Practices
Instead of early fulfillment of the American Dream it promises,
consumer credit may spin its own dream-the nightmare of
overcommitment. This work analyzes the forces that drive debtors' and
creditors' actions when overcommitment occurs.
Because collectors typically traffic in the misery of others, they
seldom bask in the light of public esteem, even when the claims they
collect are the result of debtor profligacy rather than debtor misfortune.
While few collectors who work for reputable lenders remotely resemble
the villains of 19th century melodramas-those who cast penniless
widows and children into the stormy night-they are still sometimes
identified with those actors who bygone audiences loved to hate.
Why the work of these collectors is beneficial, however, to debtors
who timely honor their obligations is obvious: collectors reduce the cost
and increase the availability of credit. Perhaps somewhat less obvious
are the benefits that flow from collectors' work to many other debtors-those who are motivated to confront volitional imbalances in their
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income and expenses while they still may be corrected without
bankruptcy or other financial debacle.
But the work of collectors is not always beneficial to debtors or to
their creditors. This analysis of the dynamics of the collection process
explores why collectors often have insisted on immediate payment when
giving debtors extensions would appear to enhance prospects for
recovery. The role 'for an intermediary in assisting certain troubled
debtors and their creditors in effecting workouts without the intervention
of the bankruptcy court is readily suggested by an episode in which one
debtor's efforts to "go it alone" were unsuccessful.
B. Creditors' Self-Inflicted Wounds in
Microcosm-Kelly's Case
Even the most avid reader of advance sheets or on-line computer
services providing reports of cases decided by the courts will be
unfamiliar with the following report of Kelly's' case because none of
the parties in that collection tragedy ever invoked legal process. I justify
my usurpation of the roles of two major institutions-a duly constituted
court and the West Publishing Company-on the grounds that collection
tragedies, like Kelly's, often occur in a non-judicial setting. Those that
do find their way into cases reported by courts seldom analyze in any
detail the ultimate issues with which I am concerned here. Relating
Kelly's sad tale in some detail provides a necessary background for the
subsequent analysis of creditors' behavior with which this work is
concerned.
Although I derive my report of Kelly's case solely from interviews
with her, I quizzed her at length and believe my report is substantially
accurate. Even if Kelly's case is misstated in some respects, the
important point is that there are cases, probably numerous ones, that do
reflect the facts that are material to the analysis that follows.
After more than three months of unemployment, finding a job
provided Kelly with only temporary relief. While her earnings were
modest, her creditors' demands for full payment of all overdue accounts
were not. The threats by a secured lender to repossess her car and by
the electric company to discontinue service easily leveraged their claims
into priority. Meanwhile, Kelly faced growing discontent from two
banks located in a city 300 miles away, which had issued her credit
cards. Their collection departments telephoned frequently and exacted
large checks, even if postdated. In time, insinuations of vaguely

1. To protect Kelly's right of privacy, I have changed her given name, omitted her
surname, and changed certain identifying details in my report of her case.
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unpleasant consequences that would accompany continued arrearages
gave way to veiled and then direct threats to garnish wages and send
damaging reports to credit bureaus. Some of the actions of Kelly's
creditors may have violated statutory and common law norms,2 but the
usual impediments to bringing judicial action loomed even larger to the
impoverished debtor than to other would-be plaintiffs. Besides, Kelly
wished to pay her debts, not to sue her creditors.
By turns embarrassed by her plight and resolute in her catch-up
efforts, Kelly worked to convince her creditors that her need and
perseverance warranted extended terms for payment. Creditors received
small payments with promises of larger ones as her condition improved.
Things were far from hopeless. Barring another interruption of income
or the incurrence of unexpected expenses, Kelly could have paid her
obligations in 18 to 24 months.
Her plan necessitated a no-frills budget. Loss of a contact lens meant
resurrection of an old pair of glasses or suffering impaired vision for the
one occasion she felt glasses inappropriate-her wedding. Despite the
quality of her performance and the extent of her explanations, the banks
adamantly refused to extend her terms for payment and relentlessly
demanded more than she was able to pay. Shortly after Kelly and her
equally impecunious husband had their checking account closed due to
overdrafts, they moved without providing her creditors a forwarding
address. In the parlance of collectors, Kelly "skipped."
While she may find new employment and resume payments, her
experience is unlikely to enhance her willingness or ability to do so. A
creditor may think it worthwhile to "skip trace" Kelly and sue if she can
be found, but the recovery after expenses may be less than the amount
Kelly would have voluntarily paid if her creditors had acquiesced in her
workout plan. A more serious flaw in the pursuing creditor's calculus
could cause the additional costs of collection to exceed any recovery
from Kelly.

2. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994), regulates
informal or nonjudicial collection practices; however, this Act applies only to actions of thirdparty debt collectors. Some states have extended the scope of their various legislative regulations
of the debt collection process to include the actions of a creditor collecting its own claims. See
ROBERT J. HOBBS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 423-28 (1987)

(chart of state debt collection statutes). Moreover, tort remedies may provide redress to injured
consumers. See id. at 215-28.
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Exemption laws3 and the debtor's concealment of non-exempt assets
may thwart a creditor's attempt to collect by legal process. Creditors and
their collection agencies may use self-help or judicial remedies such as
discovery depositions, creditors' bills, and proceedings supplementary
to execution to discover debtors' assets. No discovery procedures are
costless, however, and creditors are understandably reluctant to risk
throwing good money after bad.
Should Kelly feel trapped again, she may embark on yet another
journey to yet another community. At this juncture, however, she will
more likely go to a Federal courthouse. There she will seek, and
probably obtain, discharge of her debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,4 eschewing, because of her earlier tribulations, a court
protected partial or full workout under Chapter 13.
Because Kelly has no significant assets, the most obvious cost of her
discharge in Chapter 7, the forfeiture of her non-exempt property,5 will
be minimal. Kelly's paucity of resources, however, also furthers her
ability to play hide-and-seek with her creditors and to escape their
efforts at collection without needing to invoke the protection of the
bankruptcy court.
All this conjecture, which probably seems too obvious to those
familiar with collections to warrant exposition, does have a purpose-to
reveal a paradox worthy of serious exploration by students of debtorcreditor law. If Kelly's failure to work her way out of debt was
attributable to her creditors' inflexible stance, and if that stance probably
will cause those creditors to suffer a loss, why did these supposedly
rational actors behave in such a counterproductive way?
Where the question is addressed to a discrete case, as it is here, an
easy answer is suggested. Kelly's creditors may have had information
based on their experience in collection matters that caused the present
value of her promised performance to appear less than the recovery that
continuing their coercive collection efforts would produce.
Kelly's case is not reported to suggest that the collectors were better
informed or exercised better judgment than my account indicates. I

3. See generally STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS'

REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 289-333 (4th ed. 1987) (exploring some of the more
common provisions of exemption laws that vary greatly among the various jurisdictions of the

United States).
4. The grounds for denial of discharge in Chapter 7 bankruptcy are limited primarily to
cases in which the debtor has been guilty of certain misconduct, or has previously obtained a
discharge in a Chapter 7 case commenced within six years of filing the petition initiating the
subsequent Chapter 7 proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1994). Certain debts may be excepted
from the Chapter 7 discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994) (providing for exempt property).
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probably have less experience dealing with troubled debtors than Kelly's
creditors. Doubtlessly, in many cases creditors increase their recovery
by applying unrelenting pressure on debtors who need to turn their
financial affairs around before it is too late. Moreover, there are debtors
who are going to fail, and by their efforts, some creditors will get more
than others. Nevertheless, there are other debtors against whom such
pressure is counterproductive, and Kelly is offered as typifying this
group.
I do not want to explain Kelly's case by arguing that each gunslinger
misconstrued the facts and fired too soon, shooting himself in the foot.
I think the injury to Kelly's creditors could have occurred without
aberrant creditor conduct. While Kelly's case faithfully relates-even
down to the melodramatic, so suspect "contact-less" wedding-some
miserable events in the life of but one individual, her case is meant to
be generalized. From the perspective of more than three decades of
observation of consumer debt collection, I believe there have been
numerous instances in which creditors have pressed debtors beyond the
breaking point when it would appear to better serve their aims to enter
into cooperative ventures allowing extended payments.
Of course, not all cases in which creditors refuse to grant seemingly
justifiable extensions result in the failure of debtors to repay. The author
of a guest column in Newsweek relates a story similar to Kelly's but
with a happier ending.' Elizabeth Hudson lost her job as a press aide,
and, in a state of panic, initially attempted to stonewall her creditors by
ignoring their requests for payment.' She reported that "[s]ome
collectors sounded as pleasant as a salted sea slug."' After sharing the
secret of her job loss with one sympathetic creditor, she tried explaining
her situation to other creditors and promising them full payment later.9
Although some cooperated, many continued to press for immediate
payment.'0 Elizabeth Hudson survived financially, later reentered the
work force, and eventually paid her bills."
While the coercive collection practices of some of Hudson's creditors
did not result in loss to her aggregate creditors' claims, their coercive
practices still may have resulted in unnecessary costs. These costs
extend beyond the most obvious, Hudson's unnecessary suffering.
Hudson reports that, except in emergencies, she now pays cash. 2 Thus,
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Elizabeth Hudson, I Don't Need All the Credit, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1986, at 9, 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in small measure, even in this better than worse-case scenario, the credit
industry still suffers. 3
Obviously, no claim to originality accompanies my observation that
creditors' coercive collection practices may produce less recovery than
creditors' cooperation in extending payment terms. Some two decades
ago, the late Yale law teacher Arthur Leff characterized "American
collection mechanisms and institutions" as "grossly inefficient, engendering huge amounts of unnecessary grief and loss for all partici' Even then, Leff's indictment was scarcely novel.
pants."14
Recast in general terms, the question posed by Kelly's case becomes,
why do creditors seemingly act irrationally in many collection cases? So
generalized, the question suggests its answer. When commonly observed
market practices fail to comport with theory, the theory is embarrased,
not the actor in the market. The theory, thus far, lacks a more sophisticated explanation to account for what otherwise appears to be irrational
creditor behavior.
C. An Overview of This Essay and the Larger
Work from Which It Is Taken
My forthcoming book, Games Creditors Play: Collecting from
Overextended Consumers (Games Creditors Play), suggests that the
coercive and sometimes counterproductive methods often employed by
consumers' creditors are to a great extent the product of a contest
among them. To be sure, a concept so long revered by the law as
rewarding creditor diligence is not without strong underpinnings.
Therefore, I explore both the individual and collective benefits of a
system that rewards the victor rather than apportions the spoils. 5
However, I also explore why counterproductive collection practices
continue despite the existence of alternatives. To do so, I examine both
legal checks and private-ordering alternatives to the rigors of unbridled
competition among creditors. I then provide some explanations of why
traditional means of shifting from competitive to cooperative recovery,
often successfully employed in cases involving commercial debtors,
have proven less successful in consumer settings.

13. Id.
14. Arthur A. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection,
80 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1970).
15. See generally Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Doctrine That "Firstin 77me Is
First in Right," 64 NEB. L. REV. 349 (1985) (exploring the ancient notion of temporal priority
in a variety of legal contexts and concluding that the principle of encouraging economic
productivity justifies the rule).
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From its beginnings in the work of Arthur Leff,' 6 through the
contributions of William Whitford of Wisconsin 7 and Virginia's law
dean Robert Scott,18 the "lost-value" thesis has attributed debtor loss
that does not result in creditor gain to the failure of creditor and debtor
to possess accurate information concerning their viable alternatives.
Traders extending credit during most of humankind's existence had
much better access to that information. Throughout prehistory and
during most of our recorded past, people lived together in small groups.
Thus, the creditor knew what the debtor was doing and what he was
capable of doing to remedy any default. 'With that knowledge, rational
creditors do not engage in unproductive or counterproductive collection
practices. Our knowledge of each other's efforts and capabilities is not
as easy to come by in today's mass markets. Creditors can gather facts
and assess them in collection cases, but information is not costless.
Operating under the cost constraints imposed by the smaller claims that
typify consumer cases, creditors often fail to distinguish instances in
which extensions promise greater recovery from those in which
extensions are counterproductive.
Indeed, inadequate or misleading information concerning Kelly's
need for concessions or her desire or ability to turn her financial affairs
around may have contributed to her creditors' decisions not to accept
her workout plan. This asymmetry of information between creditor and
debtor does not complete, however, the explanation of the role of
informational deficits in financial debacles such as Kelly's. It more
likely pulled in tandem with another.
In most cases of serious overextension, the creditor who gives
concessions also must know whether the other creditors of the debtor
harbor similar beliefs and whether they will cooperate in a workout.
Furthermore, because no workout is without risk of failure, each creditor
will want the other creditors to make concessions commensurate with
her own so as to equitably share that risk. To prevent cheating, the
creditor must have some cost-effective means of monitoring for
problems that may arise during the workout-not only for the effect
breakdowns may have on the debtor but also for their effect on the
actions of competing creditors. Overcoming these impediments imposes
significant transaction costs that, along with those attributable to

16. Leff, supra note 14, at 40-41.
17. William C. Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer
Transactions,7 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 961-66 (1986); William C. Whitford, A Critique of the
Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 1047, 1074.
18. Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulationof CoerciveCreditorRemedies, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 730, 732-33 (1989).
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assessing the debtor's need for, commitment to, and ability to effect a
workout, must be contained.
Information deficits and asymmetries are indeed at the heart of
harmful creditor competition, but, except in a one-creditor world, they
extend beyond each creditor's uncertainties about the debtor's actions.
Any attempt to explain overly coercive collection must also reckon with
an individual creditor's rational fears that other creditors will engage in
strategic behavior, coercing the debtor to pay their claims in preference
to that of the creditor granting the concession.
Competition among creditors is therefore central to understanding
coercive practices that may diminish aggregate creditor recovery. Yet
this phenomenon of creditor competition has received scant attention in
previous analyses of consumer-credit collection practices. In the section
that follows, I explore the phenomenon in some detail by employing
elementary game-theoretic decisionmaking analysis, excerpted in large
part from Games Creditors Play. This essay then summarizes the
lessons that book imparts by its study of collection from a perspective
that heeds the significance of controlling harmful aspects of creditor
competition.
Studies in applied game theory suggest solutions to the problem of
obtaining beneficial creditor cooperation, in a manner that typically
serves a different purpose for a different constituency than Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceedings. Insights from these studies explain the role
private-sector agencies-the various consumer credit counseling services
affiliated with the National Foundation for Consumer Credit-play in
resolving the overextension problems. The now palpable presence of this
agency and its accessibility to most Americans should have significance
to lawmakers concerned with balancing debtor and creditor rights.
Qualifying debtors may now resolve their financial plight without
choosing between the sting of coercive collection, the stigma of an
unwanted bankruptcy, or both. Thus, the case for banning otherwise
justifiable creditors' remedies to prevent their harmful use against
debtors who are endeavoring to pay their obligations is considerably
diminished. Debtors whose plights are beyond the pale of workouts
sponsored by consumer credit counseling agencies may justifiably
invoke the protection of the bankruptcy courts in Chapter 7 or 13
proceedings.
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II. A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CREDrrORS'
FAiLURE TO COOPERATE

A. Modeling Creditors' Behavior as a
Game of Prisoner'sDilemma
As the analysis in the preceding section has shown, collection may
involve strategies and goals in a contest in which an individual
creditor's recovery is determined both by his own actions and by the
actions of other creditors. Concepts from the branch of mathematics
studying individuals in mutual interaction-game theory-may provide
illuminating insights."
The game of Prisoner's Dilemma is particularly useful in analyzing
the logical structure of conflicts of interest among creditors. The name,
Prisoner's Dilemma, derives from the original anecdote illustrating the
game.2' Two suspected perpetrators of a crime are caught by the police,
but there is insufficient evidence to convict either of them unless one or
both testify for the state. Absent such testimony, each can be convicted
of only a lesser crime. The suspects are separately jailed, held and
questioned by the police. They are given no opportunity to communicate
with each other. Each is promised his freedom by the prosecutor if he
incriminates the other, provided his accomplice does not likewise
incriminate him. The prosecutor also informs the prisoners of less
pleasant possibilities. The prisoner who maintains his silence when his
accomplice testifies for the state will, receive the stiffest sentence, five
years. If both incriminate the other, each will serve a two-year sentence,
twice the one-year term imposed on each if both maintain their silence
and do not assist the prosecutor.
The following matrix reflects these possible outcomes. By convention, the payoffs of the horizontal row player (Prisoner A) precede those
of the column player (Prisoner B).2

19. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953) (a comprehensive analysis of game theory by its
formulators).
20. The telling of the Prisoner's Dilemma varies slightly from one source to another. For
example, compare ANOTOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A
STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 24-25 (1965) with MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 253-58 (1982).
21. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION 5 (1976).
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PRISONER'S DILEMMA
(numbers in years of prison sentence)
PrisonerB
PrisonerA

Incriminate

Maintain Silence

Incriminate

2,2

0,5

Maintain Silence

5,0

1,1

Obviously, the collective good of the prisoners, from the standpoint
of the minimal aggregate time to be served by both, dictates that each
choose not to assist the prosecutor. This also produces an equitable
result in that both prisoners serve identical terms of one year.' Can the
prisoners' collective goal of spending the minimal aggregate time in jail
be achieved by parties unable to communicate and enter into an
enforceable agreement?
Each prisoner knows that if he fails to incriminate his accomplice
and his accomplice incriminates him, he will receive a five-year
sentence. Each prisoner also knows that his accomplice knows this, and
knows that his accomplice knows that he knows this. As an examination
of the above matrix will reveal, a prisoner is better off incriminating his
accomplice regardless of what his accomplice does. Assuming neither
prisoner is concerned with the welfare of the other or with group
welfare,' either prisoner will incriminate the other even if he believes
the other prisoner will irrationally maintain his silence.
There is empirical support for this theoretical solution. Experimental
evidence indicates that anonymous, non-communicating players engaged
in single play will behave in accordance with the predicted outcome.24
22. Ironically, the prisoners' collective good does not maximize the social good if the
prisoners are guilty of the crime charged and a longer sentence for each would be just. Theorists
engage in a worthier pursuit when they seek to resolve the players' dilemma in scenarios in
which the players' collective good coincides with the wider social good. We cast the wider
social good aside because it plays no part in the issue the game is designed to explore.
23. The assumption of individual self-interest need not deny, however, any role whatsoever
to a player's concern for the group or other individuals. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION 6-7 (1984). It is only in this broader sense that the concept of self-interest is
a necessary element in the game of Prisoner's Dilemma. For a discussion of the troublesome
ambiguities associated with the self-interest concept, see generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism,
Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309
(1986).
24. See Gerrit Wolf & Martin Shubik, Concepts, Theories and Techniques: Solution
Concepts and PsychologicalMotivation in Prisoner'sDilemma Games, 5 DECISION SCI. 153,
162 (1974).
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The paradox is that this "logical" behavior causes each to serve twice
the sentence he would have served if both had maintained silence.
Kelly's case and any of the many like it may be similarly modeled
as the "Creditor's Dilemma."' This adaptation will assume that
creditors must choose one of two strategies in collecting their claims.
Typically, creditors face a series of decisions in collecting a particular
claim. To limit the range of options for each creditor, it is necessary to
reduce a series of decisions to the notion of a strategy which covers a
range of choices."
The first strategy, "cooperation," consists of adjusting the overextended debtor's obligation, typically by extending the term for amortization of the debt. When necessary, a creditor can supplement its
acceptance of reduced payments or its grant of a temporary moratorium
on payment by forgoing late charges, reducing interest rates, or
forgiving payment of part of the principal if the workout is successful.
The second strategy, "coercion," consists of rigid insistence on
immediate payment of all amounts in arrears. This may include demands
to pay installments that are due only by the creditor's application of an
acceleration clause. The creditor employing a coercive strategy often
endeavors to promote his claim over others by the use or threat to use
more punitive measures than his fellow creditors.
The reader familiar with the literature on the Prisoner's Dilemma
will note a difference in the names assigned the strategies in Creditor's
Dilemma and those conventionally used in discussions of Prisoner's
Dilemma. Typically, a player's strategies are described for their effect
on the other player--"cooperation" or "defection." Departure from that
convention stems from the immediate focus of this study on the effect
creditors' actions have on the debtor's rehabilitation efforts. From this
perspective, the two choices are titled "cooperation" and "coercion." The
parallels with conventional designations, however, should be readily
apparent. Cooperation with the debtor, which enhances the chances of
recovery by other creditors in cases in which the model of a Prisoner's
Dilemma applies, equates with the conventional strategy of cooperation.
A strategy of coercion with respect to the debtor in an instance in which
the aggregate recovery of creditors is reduced is tantamount to the
conventional strategy of defection from the perspective of other
creditors.'

25. Sharing the same surname with the prototype of the game may initially obscure
various differences in these siblings, which will require subsequent examination.
26. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 6-10 (1957).
27. See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 23, at 7-9.
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A coercive strategy does not preclude manifestation of concern-by
feigned friendship instead of fear-for the debtor by the creditor
employing it, provided his actions are still designed to establish his
priority in payment, and he still denies needed concessions. Nor does a
cooperative strategy preclude the use of uncompromising efforts to enlist
and maintain the debtor's commitment to a viable workout plan in
which all creditors are treated equitably. Yet the critical distinction
between these two options justifies the designations chosen. One,
cooperation, signifies flexibility and fit to the debtor's and creditors'
collective needs; the other, coercion, is detrimental to those needs.
Quantifying the assumptions previously made in cases like Kelly's
could produce the following matrix. For simplicity, assume only two
creditors, with claims against their common debtor of $6000 each and
with equal powers to coerce payment. Again, the payoffs to A precede
those to B.
CREDITOR'S DILEMMA
(numbers in thousands of dollars)
CreditorB
CreditorA

Coerce

Cooperate

Coerce

2,2

5,1

Cooperate

1,5

4,4

If both creditors pressure the debtor by using coercive strategies, she
soon reaches the point where, like Kelly, she abandons her workout
efforts, and each creditor collects only one-third of his $6000 claim. The
highest aggregate recovery is achieved when both creditors cooperate
with the debtor's workout efforts; each recovers two-thirds of his claim
or $4000. This is the second best payoff for each creditor. To obtain a
slightly better payoff, either must impose substantial costs on the other
and reduce the aggregate recovery. This occurs when one creditor uses
coercion while the other employs a cooperative strategy.
As in Prisoner's Dilemma, a creditor with no means of entering a
binding agreement with other creditors will do better using the
noncooperative strategy regardless of what his opponent does. If B
cooperates, A's use of coercion garners him $5000 instead of the $4000
he would have received had he cooperated. If B employs coercion, A's
use of the same strategy produces $2000 compared with the $1000
recovery he would have received if he had cooperated. The same
incentive to employ the coercive strategy exists when the contest is
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viewed from B's perspective. Recognizing the dominance of the
coercive strategy, each creditor will employ it and receive only $2000,
one-half of the $4000 awarded each for mutual cooperation. The
dilemma is that, while each obviously prefers $4000 to $2000, neither
can afford to cooperate unless he knows in advance that the other will
do likewise. Thus, Creditor's Dilemma, like "Prisoner's Dilemma[,] is
simply an abstract formulation of some very common and very
interesting situations in which what is best for each person individually
leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would have been better off
with mutual cooperation.""8
While there are striking parallels in the Creditor's and Prisoner's
Dilemmas, the former fails to replicate the latter in certain obvious
respects. These distinctions require further analysis.
For ease in exposition, Prisoner's Dilemma incorporates a simple
means of providing the players with needed information. In the
prototype, each prisoner (1) knows the payoffs, (2) knows that the other
player knows them, and (3) knows that the other player knows that he
knows them. An omniscient prosecutor reveals these matters at the time
he presents the options to the prisoners.
In Creditor's Dilemma, neither certainty nor dissemination of
information is quite so neat. No one occupies the prosecutor's role to
inform the players of the payoffs. Of even greater import is the
threshold difficulty of reducing the payoffs to certainties. Values based
on assessments of the debtor's future performance are difficult to
ascertain with any degree of precision, and it is unlikely that creditors
will assess them identically.
Still, one may conclude that in some ordinary collection cases-in
which there is no agent to knowledgeably establish payoff parameters
and inform the contestants of those parameters-creditors possess
sufficient data to validate use of the techniques of Prisoner's Dilemma
to predict their actions. To evaluate this conclusion, one must ask what
requirements the payoffs contained in the 2 x 2 matrix must meet for
the creditor's contest to qualify as one of Prisoner's Dilemma.
The answer is that the requirements posited by game theorists are not
nearly so exacting as presentation of precise data in matrices for the
game would suggest. In lieu of requiring that all players assign absolute
values to payoffs, Prisoner's Dilemma mandates compliance with two
rules of inequality.
In the order of outcomes, the highest reward for a creditor must
occur when he chooses coercion in an instance in which the other
creditor cooperates. This temptation reward (T) is paired with the lowest
28. Id. at 9.
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outcome, the sucker's payoff (S), which is thrust upon the cooperating
player on the same play. Among the two intermediate payoffs, both of
which result from choices of the same strategy by each creditor, the
reward for mutual cooperation (R) must exceed the punishment for
mutual coercion (P). Hence, the first rule of inequality is T > R > P >
S. 9 Based on this rule, a creditor contemplating S will be motivated to
use a coercive strategy to get at least P, while one contemplating R will
be attracted to the coercive strategy to get T.
A model based on Prisoner's Dilemma also must meet a second rule
of inequality. If an even chance of receiving temptation (T) or sucker
(S) payoffs--of exploiting or being exploited-produced a higher payoff
than R-the reward for mutual cooperation-then the players could
escape their dilemmas by relying on chance to divide the greater gains
from taking turns exploiting one another in repeated contests. Creditors
do engage each other in iterated games. To foreclose this resolution of
the dilemma, the reward for mutual cooperation must be greater than the
arithmetic mean of the sum of the temptation and sucker payoffs, or R
> (1/2) (T + S).0

Sufficient conditions exist for Creditor's Dilemma when each player
assesses the value of the four payoffs in accordance with these two rules
of inequality. Increasing one payoff, however, while keeping others
constant may affect the choices of actual as opposed to purely rational
players, even though the revised payoffs still comport with the rules of
inequality. In an experiment in which 70 pairs of college students played
Prisoner's Dilemma games 300 times in succession, researchers reported
that cooperative responses between players tended to increase with
relative increases in R or S and decrease with relative increases in T or
1
p.

3

While it simplifies the presentation of Creditor's Dilemma to assume
that the players assign identical values to each of the four payoffs, this
symmetry is not required.32 Moreover, neither player need assign an
absolute value to any of the payoffs, provided her rank ordering of all
and relative weighing of the relevant three comply, respectively, with
the first and second rules of inequality.33 Finally, it is not necessary
that the players measure the value of their payoffs by the same
determinants. One commentator suggests that a cooperating bureaucrat
who leaks a story to a journalist might get rewarded by "a chance to

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id. at 9-10; RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 20, at 33-34.
See AXELROD, supra note 23, at 10; RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 20, at 34-35.
See RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 20, at 35, 48.
AXELROD, supra note 23, at 17.
Id.
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have a policy argument presented in a favorable light," while the
cooperating
"journalist might [get] rewarded with another inside
34
story.

While recovery of their respective claims provides creditors a
common determinant of value, one creditor may supplement his payoff
from recovery of his claim with other values, which his opponent may
share not at all or only nominally. When this occurs, these incremental
values will be reflected in one creditor's perception of the payoff matrix,
though not in the other's. For example, one creditor may be concerned
with the effect of collection practices on the subsequent patronage of a
rehabilitated debtor and those friends and relatives that the debtor
influences. This creditor's additional increment of value may benefit
more from the employment of one strategy-typically cooperation-than
the other. Conversely, one creditor, but not the other, may assign
additional utility to the coercive strategy for its perceived enhancement
of his reputation as a forceful collector with other delinquent debtors. Of
course, any creditor's projection of payoffs from all sources must still
meet the tests of the two rules of inequality.
These rules are but a subset of a larger assumption of game
theory-that players strive to maximize utility. But one player's utility
may not conform with others' widely shared notions of the goal or goals
of the contest and, thus, with the payoff matrix as commonly perceived.
In some instances, that player's aberrant values may replace those
shared by others. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa furnish an example
of how these idiosyncratic values may assume paramount, even sole
importance." When poker is played for money, a player should choose
strategies based on the money outcome, but players who enjoy bluffing
for its own sake may do so with no regard for the money outcome.36
Likewise, a creditor may wish to punish a debtor for what he perceives
as that debtor's profligate ways, regardless of the effect that punishment
has on the recovery of his claim. While such distortions of commonly
shared goals diminish the explanatory power of a creditor's contest
modeled on Prisoner's Dilemma, their incidence probably is rare. For a
large, bureaucratic creditor, the bottom line on collection practices is the
bottom line on the financial statement.
Simplicity in presentation alone provides sufficient reason for
limiting each creditors' assessment of the values in the preceding matrix
to recovery of his outstanding claim. But the exclusion of other

34. Id.
35. See LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 26, at 3-6.
36. Id. at 5.
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considerations-and the two picked as illustrative appear to be the most
significant-may be justified on other grounds as well.
The contribution of coercive practices in a single case to the
creditor's reputation for forcefulness, a peripheral concern, pales when
compared with the more tangible goal of maximizing actual recovery in
that case. A case that otherwise clearly meets the Creditor's Dilemma
tests is unlikely to be disqualified solely by the value a creditor attaches
to furthering his reputation for diligent collection efforts. Concern with
that reputation, however, may influence the creditor's conduct in other
instances. Where mutual cooperation between creditors offers no clear
promise of increased recovery and a creditor is contemplating the use
of more stringent measures to increase pressure on the debtor, the
creditor's decision may be influenced by the need to convince other
delinquent debtors of his persistence in collecting claims. In some cases,
this complementary factor may cause a creditor to invest more resources
in coercive effort than is justified by the probable recovery in the case.
The second consideration beyond recovery maximization also will
not influence that creditor's choice of strategies in many instances. In
today's mass markets for retail finance, creditors carry thousands of
consumer accounts and employ standardized procedures that permit little
that is cost effective in the way of individual attention to particular
accounts. In such an environment, it is difficult to conceive of any
creditor ascribing significant value to the prospect of subsequent
transactions with an individual who already has commanded the
attention of his collection department. In a less mobile society with
more parochial lenders, loss of goodwill of a consumer, her extended
family, or her friends may have carried appreciable weight. Today, such
considerations appear limited primarily to some extenders of commercial
credit whose business is concentrated among a few customers.
The conditions that result in a commercial supplier's dependency on
one large buyer may stem from institutional economies that also make
the buyer dependent on the supplier. Oliver Williamson finds that these
conditions exist where highly specialized inputs of production preclude
other ready sources of supply but the buyer's needs are insufficient to
result in equal economies of scale through self-production.37 In
consumer transactions, where there is no common parallel to this
symbiosis, the parties make far less effort to sustain the business
relationship. Even if the buyer has frequently recurring needs, the value
of his patronage is typically no greater than that of numerous other
customers. And the value of any consumer's patronage must be further
37. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 250 (1979).
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diminished when, as is often the case in recent years, the credit grantor
is a card-issuing bank that does not derive a profit or other income,
other than the small transaction fee imposed on the merchant seller,
from the sale of the goods or services.
Another factor diminishes the value a creditor assigns to his concern
with the goodwill of customers and his reputation as a diligent collector.
Obviously, any value assigned to one of the goals must be reduced by
the value the creditor assigns the other, for the actions that further one
are the antithesis of those that further the other. A creditor's need to
balance customer goodwill with a reputation for collection that militates
against his claim being ignored or subordinated to those of other
creditors is reflected in collection systems that employ gradually
increased pressure on delinquent debtors. When more stringent
collection measures seem necessary, the use of a collection agency may
afford the creditor some protection against loss of customer goodwill.
Some customers, even some delinquent debtors who are the objects of
the collection agency's harsh actions, fail to hold the creditor responsible for the actions of the agent he employs.
Any attempt at an exhaustive compendium and valuation of all
factors that may influence any given creditor's perception of the payoff
matrix is doomed to failure for the same reason that an attempt at a
complete decision theory of human behavior would be absurd. Russell
Hardin contends that "[o]nly in an assumed context can one sensibly be
asked whether one's action was rational."38 He offers two objections
to expanding the calculus of an individual's decisionmaking process in
regard to participation in collective action beyond the commonly
recognized goals of others in his group. First, the additional factors,
which could only be crudely measured because they stem from a host
of motivations, would not be worth measuring since most of the relevant
behavior may be explained by the narrowest assessment of costs and
benefits. Second, the expanded variables may only explain the conduct
of certain members of the group, not that of most of its members.
The appearance of absolute certainty in the payoffs contained in the
matrix for Creditor's Dilemma must be qualified for a further reason.
No outcome reflects payment of the entire $6000 claim of either creditor
even though there are doubtlessly numerous cases in which creditors do
recover full payment, including interest for extensions, from debtors in
distress. However, all payoffs in the matrix are discounted to reflect that
no intersection of strategies guarantees complete recovery for either
player in a particular case.3 9 They recognize only that some combina38. RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1982).

39. See, e.g., The Business in Trouble-A Workout Without Bankruptcy, 39 Bus. LAW.
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tions hold greater promise than others. Again, the payoffs contained in
the matrix for Creditor's Dilemma are meant to suggest, not to be, the
perceptions of the creditors in the game.
Unlike Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual cooperation in Creditor's
Dilemma produces only a probability of the best collective outcome for
the creditors. As even the most promising of workouts may fail,
creditors typically insist that the extensions of payment and any other
concessions of any one are commensurate with those of the others.
Reaching an agreement that equitably shares the risks of the workout
imposes an additional dimension and further transaction costs on a.
cooperative solution to a Creditor's Dilemma. In consumer workouts,
creditors frequently agree to pro-rata extensions of all or substantially
all unsecured claims. In commercial cases, where workout may require
not only extensions of existing debt but further extensions of credit and
resolutions of difficult business decisions, negotiations among creditors
may be highly complex.
Contests among consumers' creditors frequently arise in cases where
there is no impartial agent to credibly ascertain and disseminate
information on outcomes. However, the tests imposed by the rules of
inequality are not so stringent as to preclude analyzing some contests as
games of Prisoner's Dilemma. While the flexible rules of inequality may
facilitate creditors' determinations of payoff parameters in accordance
with the requisites of Prisoner's Dilemma, the ability of creditors to do
so requires further elaboration.
Implicit in the concept of any game is the players' awareness of the
contest and its rules. Before each creditor reasons as Prisoner's Dilemma
predicts, she must know that she is engaged in a contest with another
creditor and that both view the payoff parameters in accordance with the
,rules of inequality. She also must know that the other creditor knows
that she knows this. These barriers are not necessarily insurmountable
in cases where the services of a facilitating agent are absent.
A creditor may know she is engaged in a contest if a delinquent
debtor tells her that the collection line has already formed. Even if the
debtor fails to do so, it is difficult to conceive of a creditor so myopic
as to believe that she alone extended credit to the debtor. If one creditor
equates the outcomes of her collection strategies with the rules of
inequality, that creditor may believe that others will do likewise.
In any case in which these assumptions hold, creditors will perceive
their collection efforts as a game of Prisoner's Dilemma. This does not

1041, 1041-74 (1984) (edited transcript of a panel discussion presented on August 2, 1983, by
the Commercial Financial Services Committee of the then Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association).
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mean that collectors familiarize themselves with works on that subject
and expend time and effort constructing matrices or otherwise formally
engaging the rules of game theory. Riding herd on those who stray from
their financial obligations affords little opportunity for these harried
outriders of a credit economy to pursue such abstractions. The utility of
Prisoner's Dilemma is not that it furnishes its players with a guide for
their actions but that it furnishes a general framework for analyzing
those actions. Characterizing a collection contest as a game of Prisoner's
Dilemma simply means that the creditors face the same frustrations in
choosing their strategies as do the prisoners in the prototype of the
game. Creditors can readily comprehend these frustrations even if they
are not familiar with the concept of Prisoner's Dilemma.
The issue in Kelly's case was why her two principal unsecured
lenders continued their efforts to maximize short-term recovery when
their mutual cooperation in the workout she proposed held greater
promise. The initial analysis of the case assumed that both banks
believed that their aggregate recovery would be enhanced by cooperating
in a workout. Thus, Kelly's case was first cast as a game of Prisoner's
Dilemma. The explanation offered earlier-that each bank would adopt
a coercive stance to prevent the other from taking advantage of a
cooperative stance-did not employ and did not need to employ the
language or formal rules of game theory. The coercive action of each
bank was attributable to its schooling in the practical aspects of
creditors' and debtors' behavior. Each knew that debtors are likely to
pay more insistent creditors first. As a result, the race of coercive
diligence was on.
B. The Transaction-CostBarrier to a Cooperative
Solution of the Creditor'sDilemma
1. The Scope of the Barrier
Before concluding that competition necessarily results in an
equilibrium of mutual coercion, a significant final step in the analysis
remains. Motivation for a cooperative solution is a corollary of the same
forces in the matrix that frustrate choice of that cooperative solution.
The players in both the Prisoner's and Creditor's Dilemma are provided
an incentive, even though acting on purely selfish grounds, to cooperate
with each other: the prisoners by maintaining their silence and the
creditors by extending their terms of payment. Yet, the prisoners will
not likely cooperate. Stone walls, barred windows and guards enforce
the prosecutor's decision to separate the prisoners and prevent any
communication that may result in either an enforceable agreement
between them or, a likely alternative in a prison setting, credible mutual
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threats. Again, the rococo embellishments of the prototype parody life's
more commonly encountered analogues.
The impediments to a cooperative solution to a Creditor's Dilemma,
suggested earlier by Kelly's case, were transaction costs. Cost-effective
means must be devised to ensure that no creditor succumbs to the lure
of the temptation payoff and pairs another creditor's cooperative strategy
with his coercive one. As vivid symbols of constraint, these transaction
costs pale in comparison with the devices so readily available to the
prosecutor. Yet the bonds they place upon actors on the economic stage
may be as constraining as prisoner cells.
Transaction costs play a significant role in the analysis of both
economics 40 and law."' To an economist explaining their effect on the
market exchange of commodities, they include those costs "that stem
specifically from the market process," such as expenditures incurred in
the communication of offers, comparisons of alternatives, negotiation of
contracts and verification of the performance of those contracts. 42
Commentators on the basic principles of law and economics also give
the concept wide scope. Judge Posner defines transaction costs as "the
costs involved in ordering economic activity through voluntary
exchange, ' 43 while Mitchell Polinsky subsumes within the term "the
costs of identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs
process itself,
of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining
4
and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached."

40. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & AMIHAI GLAZER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
375-87 (5th ed. 1992) (analyzing the effect of transaction costs on market equilibrium).
41. Judge Posner observes that transaction costs "are a recurrent theme" in his comprehensive study of law and economics, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367 (3d
ed. 1986), a statement that is amply confirmed by numerous references to the subject in the
index of his book, see id. at 665. Credit for seminal studies on the importance of transaction
costs in the analysis of law goes to Ronald H. Coase. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
(n.s.) 386 (1937), reprintedin READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331 (George J. Stigler & Kenneth
E. Boulding eds., 1952). In 1991, Coase received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Science for his work in transaction costs. Friction Theorist Wins Economics Nobel, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 16, 1991, at BI. Speaking at a meeting of law school professors earlier that year, Coase
remarked that "the key concept in all my analytical schemes is transaction costs." Ronald Coase,
Address at the Luncheon of the Section on Law and Economics of the Association of American
Law Schools (Jan. 4, 1991). Other significant contributions to the study of transaction costs
include OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975), Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968), Williamson, supra note 37.
42. HIRSHLEIFER & GLAZER, supra note 40, at 378.
43. POSNER, supra note 41, at 231.
44. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCniON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1983).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

21

FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 3
Florida
Law
Review,

[Vol. 48

The breadth of the concept of transaction costs, however, has
engendered criticism of the device as an analytical tool. One commentator complained that" '[t]ransaction costs have a well-deserved bad name
as a theoretical device ... [partly] because there is a suspicion that
almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified
transaction costs.' ""4While the complaint has merit, transaction costs
broadly defined appear to be the sole barrier to obtaining rational
cooperation by creditors in workouts that appear promising.
In recognizing transaction costs as the culprit that may prevent
creditors from pursuing mutually beneficial cooperative strategies,46 my
intent is to give the concept wide meaning, including within its
parameters all costs associated with obtaining concerted creditor action
by agreement, tacit or formal.
For any creditor who will consider undertaking the task of sponsoring a workout, initial transaction costs include obtaining and verifying
relevant data concerning the debtor's income, necessary living expenses,
and obligations. After concluding that the debtor has a cash-flow
problem that transcends mere reasonable curtailment of discretionary
expenses, the creditor must consider whether a workout is feasible and
the probability that the debtor will use any extensions given to promote
her financial recovery, rather than use the relief from creditors' pressure
to slip further into debt. Consideration of further data that reflect on the
debtor's financial character-such as her past credit history, stability of
employment, and the reasons for her overextension-may assist him in
making this judgment, but in many cases the call will still be a difficult
one.
Where the sponsoring creditor bases his decision in favor of an
extension plan on a less than clear probability that it will enhance
aggregate creditor recovery, the costs of the additional steps he must
take to bring the workout to fruition will increase. The sponsoring
creditor must contact the other creditors, or certainly the principal ones,
and convince them of the benefits of the plan. The absence of precise
criteria for measuring the workout's chance of success will increase the
costs of securing the other creditors' cooperation in two ways. First,
there are negotiation costs that are necessary to allocate benefits among
the parties. This impediment assumes increasing importance where the
benefit is questionable and difficult to measure. Second, there are costs

45. Williamson, supra note 37, at 233 (quoting Stanley Fischer, Long-Term Contracting,
Sticky Prices, and Monetary Policy: Comment, 3 J. MONETARY EcON. 317, 322 n.5 (1977)).
46. See Whitford, supra note 17, at 1077 (observing that transaction costs frequently
preclude resolution of conflicts between single creditors and creditors as a class through
bargaining and agreement among them).
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associated with mutually beneficial exchanges resolving the more
fundamental issue of whether the proposed transaction offers any benefit
for the parties to share.
Obviously, a creditor's estimate of the amount of his recovery in a
contest with other creditors also poses a problem of valuation. However,
there is a presumption, presumably empirically derived, that a creditor's
recovery is generally increased by application of continuing pressure for
immediate payment. In the words of one commentator, "[e]xperience has
shown that there is a definite correlation between the length of time
debts are unpaid and the volume of resulting bad debt losses."'4 7 As
analysis in the next subsection will show, the burden of proof in a
collection case is typically assigned to the proponent of the extension
plan.
An additional element of the transaction costs of securing the
cooperation of creditors in workouts is not inconsequential. Someone
must continually and impartially monitor the actions of the debtor and
all her creditors during the implementation of the plan to ensure goodfaith compliance with its terms. Even when the sponsoring creditor is
willing to undertake this additional task, an all too evident conflict of
interest seriously impairs his ability to function as an impartial agent.
Obviously, transaction costs in all their facets will defeat a mutually
beneficial exchange only when those costs exceed the perceived value
of the exchange to the parties.4" There are reasons, however, for
believing that transaction costs impose more significant barriers on
workouts than on typical market transactions, such as ordinary sales of
goods or services. Judge Posner attributes high transaction costs to two
primary factors: (1) a large number of parties to a transaction and (2)
the inability of the parties to the transaction to deal with others, a
condition economists term "bilateral monopoly."49 He observes that
"costs of transacting are highest where elements of bilateral monopoly
coincide with a large number of parties to the transaction-a quite
possible conjunction."50 Both elements are typically present in workouts.
Although I have cast, for ease in exposition, only two players in my
rendition of the Creditor's Dilemma, the number of parties in a workout
will frequently exceed the two ordinarily found in a sale of goods or
services. The certain presence in workouts of a bilateral monopoly, an

47. ROBERT H. COLE, CONSUMER AND
1976).
48. See POSNER, supra note 41, at 55.
49. Id. at 54.

COMMERCIAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT

371 (5th ed.

50. Id. at 55.
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atypical condition in other market transactions, also may protract the
negotiation process. Creditors are unable to deal with anyone other than
each other. This gives each creditor an incentive to hold out for the
promise of a more expedited payment on his claim than that made to
other creditors as the price for any concessions. The creditor who holds
out for preferential treatment need not appear unreasonable. He may
base his claim on his real or feigned belief that the plan offers less
chance of benefit than that perceived by its proponents.
The context of a workout adds a further element that magnifies
transaction costs. The parties must negotiate in a setting of financial
distress. This setting makes the conflicts of interest and incentives for
deception present in the transaction even more acute.5 '
While transaction costs may impose insurmountable barriers on
creditors obtaining the benefits of a workout, do those that were present
in Kelly's case appear that formidable? So long as the assumption holds
that each of the two principal creditors from whom she sought extensions believed that mutual concessions would further both of their
individual recoveries, the answer would appear to be no. In our
exchange economy, the perceived mutual advantage of traders overcomes the costs of the exchange process in millions of transactions
every day. In these exchanges, transaction costs reduce the aggregate
benefit of traders and are thus a form of market imperfection. Traders,
however, often willingly incur these costs to reduce other imperfections
that would impose even more significant defects on the exchange
process.52 Although the smaller claims at stake meant that the benefits
of the workout in Kelly's case were of a lesser magnitude than those
posited in the matrix for Creditor's Dilemma, it is difficult to comprehend how the transaction costs of either of Kelly's creditors obtaining
the cooperation of the other could have exceeded the probable benefits
of such action. Enough of the force that triggers voluntary undertakings
should have been present even if the tradeoffs promised Kelly's
creditors only the probability of small net gains. 3
Kelly's case presents a collection setting more appealing than most
for predicting her creditors' assumption of the transaction costs of a
workout. The coercive practices that resulted in Kelly's abandonment of
51. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of CorporateBorrowing, 5 J.FIN. ECON. 147,
158 (1977).
52. See, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER & GLAZER, supra note 42, at 377 (observing that traders on

the New York Stock Exchange incur the costs of trading on the exchange to avoid individual
merchandise inspection costs).
53. Cf. ARTHUR A. LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 118-30 (1976) (discussing the most
common ploy in selling, "The Squaresville Pitch." in which the seller credibly explains its
marginal cost advantage and its reason for sharing that advantage with the buyer).
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her repayment efforts resulted from the actions of only two of her
creditors, her credit-card issuing banks. As previously noted in the report
of her case, Kelly was also pursued by a utility company that threatened
discontinuance of essential services and a secured lender that threatened
repossession of the automobile that she needed to get to and from work.
While Kelly's rehabilitation plan gave these creditors a preference in
payment of arrearages over the claims of the banks, it is customary in
workouts to protect assets that are vital to the success of the debtor's
efforts. This practice is followed in counselor-assisted workouts where
equitable treatment of creditors is otherwise the norm. While Kelly's
problems with these banks were exacerbated by the fact that they were
located in another state and in a city some 300 miles from her residence
at the time she attempted to obtain their cooperation, this fact does not
appear to be unduly significant in this age of increased mobility.
Kelly's failure to obtain the cooperation of the banks may have
resulted from one or more of several factors, all of which may be
subsumed under the rubric of transaction costs. Even though each bank
only had to secure the cooperation of the other, the banks may not have
been able to agree on how to share the risks and benefits of the
workout. One or both may have insisted upon more than a pro-rata share
of Kelly's payments until its claim was paid. Moreover, even if an
agreement could have been reached, each bank may have feared that the
other's collectors subsequently would have ignored the plan. It seems
more likely that Kelly's case released the complete array of transaction
costs that can defeat beneficial action by creditors, and therein lies its
value as the paradigm of this study.
Abandoning the hypothesis that both banks could discern the benefits
of the plan solely from Kelly's presentation of it unleashes a difficult
threshold issue. Did the banks believe that they could improve their
prospects for payment if both accepted Kelly's proposal? A negative
answer on the part of both banks may have ended the matter. However,
it is not unlikely that Kelly's self-advocacy convinced one or both banks
to give the workout a chance if either of them were her only creditor,
but convinced neither to accept Kelly's plan in a world requiring
concessions from two creditors. Neither bank was willing to advocate
acceptance of Kelly's proposal-with or without additional investigation
of the facts-to the other. Nor was either bank willing to grant a
unilateral extension. The use of a liberal extension by one bank, even
without any extension by the other, may have provided Kelly with a
means to support her workout efforts. Creditors frequently give
extensions to debtors who have suffered reversals without regard to the
actions of other creditors, provided the debtor's plight is not so extreme
as to raise justifiable fears that he will fail. Ironically, so far as the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

25

REVIEW Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 3
LAW
FLORIDA
Florida
Law
Review,

[Vol. 48

debtor is concerned, only when extensions are most needed do they
appear to be conditioned on the additional, often difficult burden of
obtaining concerted creditor action.
Before summarizing how to best systematically contain all transaction costs of resolving a Creditor's Dilemma within the severe cost
constraints that characterize the collection of consumer debt, the next
subsection further explores the effects of a creditor's failure to properly
discern the nature of the contest. Inadequate or incorrect data, judgmental error, or both may distort a creditor's perception of the setting that
dictates her choice of collection strategies.' Altering that creditor's
erroneous perception to comport with reality imposes further transaction
costs, which must also be readily contained in any cost-effective
resolution of a Creditor's Dilemma. This work introduced the causes of
this misperception problem in its analysis of Kelly's case by relaxing
the initial assumption that her creditors discerned the benefits of their
mutual cooperation. Following a similar relaxation of that assumption,
this subsection has further explored the problem in the context of the
elements of transaction costs. What remains is to explore, with further
assistance from game-theoretic analysis, how creditors' misperceptions
of the collection setting almost invariably lead to their choice of
coercion over cooperation. The following subsection will address how
the strategies dictated by those misperceptions foreclose resolution of
the Creditor's Dilemma by misguided, chance applications of cooperative strategies.
2. A Closer Look at Creditors' Misperceptions of the Collection
Setting: Zero-Sum Games and No Contests
While the players of Prisoner's Dilemma are in conflict with each
other, there is an important difference between the nature of their
relationship and the relationship of the players in a significantly
different contest that creditors frequently play-the zero-sum game. In
the zero-sum game, the winnings of one player are the losses of another,
so that the algebraic sum of the payoffs to each player always equals
zero.55 Players of zero-sum games face no dilemma in formulating a
strategy. Because a pure conflict of interest exists, each player unambiguously acts in her self-interest by picking the strategy designed to
maximize her payoff. Cooperation plays no role because the players
cannot increase their aggregate recovery. Examination of the dynamics
54. Cf. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1115 (1981) (observing information costs may render ineffective the enforcement

of a best-efforts obligation by the standard contract suit).
55. See RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 20, at 13-14.
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of a zero-sum game will not only illustrate the futility of cooperation by
creditors in such a contest but will highlight the unique role the
incentive for cooperation may play in resolving a creditors' contest that
is a game of Prisoner's Dilemma. While the pure conflict of interest
present in a zero-sum game is of little psychological interest, the partly
coincident and partly opposed interests of the players in Prisoner's
Dilemma provides a study in internal conflict, which captures the
imagination of students of psychology and serious literature."
The following matrix presents a zero-sum contest between two
creditors. The matrix contains payoffs to the horizontal row player (A)
from the column player (B). Because the game is zero-sum, the payoffs
to B from A are the same as those to A from B with the opposite sign
attached. A receives payoffs greater than zero, and B receives those less
than zero. Obviously, the debtor makes the payments to both creditors,
and neither creditor pays the other. To present the game, however, as
one between rival creditors from a common debtor, the payoffs,
although made by the debtor, represent percentages of the "paying"
creditor's pro-rata share of the debtor's payments to both creditors that
are diverted to the other player in her stead. To illustrate, when A
employs strategy al and B uses strategy b2, A will receive all of her
pro-rata share of the debtor's payments plus 10% of B's share. As the
game is zero-sum, B pays for A's larger recovery by receiving 10% less
than her pro-rata share of the debtor's payments to both creditors.
THE TWO-CREDITORS', ZERO-SUM GAME
(numbers in percentages of "paying" creditor's pro-rata share)
B's Strategies

Row
Minima

A's Strategies

bl

b2

b3

al

-10

+10

+60

-10

a2

-40

-10

+50

-40

a3
Column
Maxima

-60
-10

-40
+10

-10
+60

-60

56. Cf. id. at 13 (observing that the seemingly irrational choices of participants in a
Prisoner's Dilemma forces a "reexamination of [the] concept of a rational decision," creating a
"potential contribution by game theory to psychology and to behavioral science in general").
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The payoffs in the matrix reflect the principle that relative diligence
reaps its reward. Each party's first strategy, al and bl, therefore consists
of more coercive collection measures than his second, and his second
more than his third. The least coercive strategy, a3 or b3, may consist
of nothing more than the creditor's refusal to grant extensions. In
employing his intermediate strategy, a2 or b2, the creditor may
supplement this stance with repeated demands for payment. The creditor
may act in the most coercive manner, al or bl, through threatened or
actual seizure of the debtor's property.
A may achieve his best outcome by resort to strategy al. He may
recover all of his pro-rata share of the debtor's payments to both
creditors plus 60% of B's share. A's use of his most coercive strategy,
however, will only produce this result if B opts for strategy b3. For
example, B will capture all of his pro-rata share of payments plus 10%
of A's share by employing strategy bl against A's use of al.
Upon reflection, any competent player in a game with an experienced
opponent will realize that his concern is with the least payoff that he
will receive from his choice of any particular strategy."7 Therefore he
will select the strategy that contains the best of these least payoffs. To
illustrate this point, matrices for zero-sum games typically provide
payoffs in which a player's choice of strategy to minimize loss differs
from the strategy that, in the absence of rational play by his opponent,
he would choose to obtain his maximum payoff. Stating the payoffs in
The Two-Creditors' Zero-Sum Game in that manner, however, would
ignore the principle of relative diligence: one player scores on the other
by using more coercive measures than his opponent."8 The least payoffs
to A for each of his three strategies are contained in the horizontal row
minima. Seeking the maximum of the row minima, the "maximin," 9
A selects strategy al. On the same basis, B, whose gains are measured
by numbers less than zero, is attracted to the minimum of the column
maxima, the "minimax,"' and he chooses strategy bl.
The point at which the maximin equals the minimax is known as the
"saddle point."'" One theoretician concludes that most games will have
no saddle point in pure strategies, such as that posited for The TwoCreditors' Zero-Sum Game.62 He illustrates such games by "matching
57. See id. at 21-22; Oskar Morgenstern, Game Theory: Theoretical Aspects, in 6
62, 64 (1968).
Morgenstern, supra note 57,
at
21-22;
note
20,
supra
&
CHAMMAH,
58. See RAPOPORT

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs

at 64.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Morgenstern, supra note 57, at 64.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 64-65.
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pennies," a contest in which A wins only if the side of his coin
presented matches that of B's.63 In this game, A will certainly lose if
B is able to predict A's choice of heads or tails." A must employ a
chance mechanism to prevent B from doing so, one which selects either
side of his coin with equal probability.65 Such randomization may be
achieved by flipping the coin before each showing of it.' The importance of relative diligence in most collection contests dictates, however,
that a depiction of the typical creditors' contest contain a saddle point
in pure strategies, each player's choice of his most coercive strategy.
Each player will choose the strategy producing this result because he
can do no better against a knowledgeable, self-interested opponent.
While A will lose 10% of his pro-rata share of the debtor's payments
to B for his use of strategy al against B's employment of bl, A's
choice of either other strategy would result in even greater losses against
B's use of bl.
The payoff matrix need not reflect one creditor's priority over
another in a contest of both's ultimate coercive strategies as a necessary
element in a creditor's zero-sum game. But neither is the outcome in the
matrix in this respect an aberrant one. It merely reflects a common fact
in collection cases: that some creditors, whether based on their secured
status or their employment of more imaginative collectors, are able to
project a more commanding posture than others.
Of what utility is the preceding model of The Creditors' Zero-Sum
Game in informing our understanding of strategic choices in actual
collection contests? With what frequency do such contests fit within the
theoretical model? To pattern real contests on the model, certain
conditions must exist.
Doubtlessly, there are cases where the debtor's distress is beyond
relief, financial failure is imminent, and the sole issue is how competing
creditors will distribute a finite pool of assets amongst themselves.
Given the priority generally accorded superior methods of coercion, it
seems highly unlikely that any creditor in such a contest would perceive
her maximin (or minimax) as dictating anything other than employment
of her most coercive strategy. Thus, there are collection contests that are
zero-sum games with saddle points that lie at the intersection of the
contestants' most coercive strategies.
The zero-sum model assumes wider applicability to creditors'
contests when the limits of the requirement that creditors perceive the

63.
64.
65.
66.

See id.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
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contest as one for a limited pool of assets are explored. This characteristic is fundamental in distinguishing zero-sum games from those of
Prisoner's Dilemma, for, as the preceding analysis has shown, the basic
difference in the types of conflict experienced by the contestants in these
two games stems from the futility of their cooperation in the former
contest and the promise of that action in the latter.
Zero-sum games have a satisfactory solution because the interests of
the parties are diametrically opposed, whether a saddle point results
from the use of pure or random strategies. No gain for one player can
occur without a corresponding loss for the other because no concerted
action by the players can increase the pool of assets out of which their
claims will be paid.
Previous examination of the Creditor's Dilemma matrix established,
however, that the noncooperative equilibrium of mutual coercion
provides only the third-best recovery for each party in that contest. In
all other outcomes, it is not possible to make one creditor better off
without making the other worse off. Thus, the equilibrium point for a
noncooperative game of Creditor's Dilemma is the only one of the four
payoffs that is not Pareto-optimal. Pareto-optimality occurs when it is
impossible "to make anyone better off without making someone else
worse off."'67 Both creditors could double their payoffs if they each
substituted their cooperative strategies for their coercive ones.
In accordance with this basic distinction in the two types of games,
the matrix for The Two-Creditors' Zero-Sum Game assumes that the
creditors cannot increase the debtor's aggregate payment on their claims
by joint cooperative action in their recovery efforts. This assumption is
necessary to pattern the creditors' contest on the model of a zero-sum
game. The matrix, however, need not necessarily assume, as it does for
the sake of simplicity in presentation, that the debtor's aggregate
payments cannot be increased by the unconcerted recovery actions of his
creditors.
There are doubtlessly collection cases, probably numerous ones, in
which creditors believe that their individual actions will result in some
further application of the debtor's resources to payment of their claims.
These cases too may qualify as zero-sum games. To do so, however,
they must be viewed by creditors as contests with other creditors. If
creditors believe that their individual collection efforts will produce
payments in an amount sufficient to pay all the debtor's obligations,
they will not perceive the collection setting as presenting a contest and
game theory will have no relevancy in predicting their actions. To
qualify as zero-sum games, these cases must be ones in which creditors
67. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 136 (15th ed. 1995) (emphasis in original).
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believe that they can expand the pool of assets available to pay them,
but that they cannot expand the pool sufficiently to pay all the claims.
This subsection will subsequently examine the propensity of creditors
to employ increasing pressure on debtors in collection cases that are not
perceived as contests with other creditors.
What effect on the predictive power of the zero-sum model results
from this recognition that creditors may enhance their aggregate
recovery by their unconcerted collection efforts? To the extent that the
effect is significant, it appears to be a positive one. The unconcerted
action that creditors perceive as conducive to increasing the resources
devoted to payment of their claims is likely to be more and not less
coercive tactics. Thus, the action dictated by this theoretical impediment
to modeling collection contests as zero-sum games will typically serve
merely to reinforce creditors' choices of their most coercive strategies
as predicted by application of a zero-sum model that ignores the
creditors' ability to increase aggregate recovery by unconcerted action.
One further aspect of the requirement that creditors by joint action
cannot increase aggregate recovery in a zero-sum game is worthy of
note. Although the gross payoffs in The Two-Creditors' Zero-Sum Game
afford no possibility of the creditors increasing the aggregate recovery
by agreement among themselves, those creditors may be motivated to
cooperate in their efforts when they consider the effects of collection
costs on their net recovery. To illustrate this point, the matrix provided
for the contest has been designed to reflect the same distribution of the
debtor's aggregate gross payments among his creditors from each
creditor's choice of his least coercive strategy (a3 and b3) as from each
creditor's choice of his most coercive strategy (al and bl), the saddlepoint equilibrium. If a more coercive strategy is more costly-and
typically it will be-each creditor's net recovery could be increased by
an agreement among those parties to use their least coercive strategies.
Although this observation qualifies the theoretical application of the
zero-sum model in some creditors' contests, it probably has little
significance in reducing the model's predictive value in actual cases
where creditors will not perceive their payoffs in the precise manner
contained in the matrix. Even if creditors have this perception, other
considerations appear to diminish the erosive effects of this costreduction factor on the applicability of the model.
Creditors will typically have far less incentive to cooperate in
choosing collection strategies when they direct their effort solely to the
reduction of collection costs than when that effort is motivated by the
probability of increasing aggregate recovery from the debtor, as in a
Creditor's Dilemma. As the transaction costs of securing cooperative
creditor action often defeat that action in a Creditor's Dilemma, it seems
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that these costs will pose an even more significant barrier when
measured against the smaller benefits at stake in a zero-sum contest.
Additionally, creditors' propensity to perceive the pool of assets directed
to payment of claims as being expandable by their employment of more
coercive strategies will militate against agreements by creditors to
employ less coercive strategies merely to curtail collection costs.
To what extent does the zero-sum model reflect the vast amount of
collection activity in this country? While no empirical data exists to
support my conclusion, I believe this model explains the actions of
collectors in far more cases than one based on Prisoner's Dilemma.
Why?
Cooperating creditors collect more in a collection case that is
properly modeled on a Prisoner's Dilemma because the debtor commits,
to a far greater extent than in a zero-sum game, his subsequent earnings
and possibly other subsequent income and acquisitions of property to
payment of creditors. Nevertheless, the case is properly modeled on a
Prisoner's Dilemma only if the debtor is committed to a workout and
the workout is feasible. Cases of significant overextensions of credit
pose a substantial risk that a debtor will resort to bankruptcy or find
other means to immunize assets acquired after creditors get serious in
their collection efforts.
Once a debtor's basic-comfort level of current consumption is
threatened, each additional dollar diverted from current consumption to
debt service will result in greater hardship to the debtor than that
resulting from the dollar diverted immediately before it.6" The increasing marginal costs of these losses in disposable income will tend to
defeat the workout efforts of all but the most serious-minded and selfdisciplined of debtors who are significantly overextended.
The rigors of this elementary economic principle seem most
pronounced when a debtor's overextension results solely from volitional
expenditures. After having grown accustomed to spending more than his
income, he must adjust his present consumption to an amount that is
less than that income, often considerably so, in order to fund the
workout. Still, even when overextensions result from non-volitional
expenses or temporary suspensions of income rather than a propensity
to overconsume, living within the strictures of a workout may exceed
the abilities of many debtors. The zero-sum model does more, however,
than explain creditors' use of coercive measures in those many contests
that would fall within its boundaries if information were costless and

68. This principle is the converse of the rule of diminishing marginal utility. See id. at 74
(observing that the concept of diminishing marginal utility recognizes that the extra utility added
by each additional unit of consumption tends to decrease).
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creditors based their strategic choices on an objective assessment of all
relevant facts. The very frequency with which it may be properly
applied engenders, I suspect, a presumption by creditors that most cases
of serious overextension are controlled by the behavior the model
predicts. The mind-set of creditors is no less a product of their
environment than that of any other occupational group. They are
witnesses to far too many financial tragedies to be other than skeptically
disposed toward the ostensible benefits of granting extensions to debtors
who are already in serious arrears.
To be sure, the presumption in favor of the zero-sum model is
rebuttable, but the burden of doing so is placed upon the proponent of
a Creditor's Dilemma model. Some of the difficulties of meeting this
burden of proof were previously explored in Kelly's case.
Information supplied solely by the debtor concerning his willingness
and ability to successfully complete a workout is suspect, at least for its
objectivity if not also for its veracity. While a creditor can often easily
verify certain facts relative to the debtor's ability to pay, such as his
salary, that creditor may face more difficulty or incur greater costs
confirming other data, such as the extent of the debtor's obligations to
other creditors. However, it is probably not as much the debtor's
representations of fact as it is his promises-his willingness to persevere
in the workout-that most concerns creditors. What is needed is some
basis for assessing the debtor's perseverance, and that often requires a
greater investment of time and effort than a single creditor can
economically justify.
Even if these obstacles can be surmounted, a final significant
obstacle remains. The creditor who contemplates sponsoring the workout
must believe that the other creditors can be convinced, as he is
convinced, of the relevancy of the Creditor's Dilemma model. If the
other creditors do not share that belief, they will be playing a zero-sum
game in contests in which the debtor is seriously overextended and will
invariably counter the sponsoring creditor's cooperative strategy with
their most coercive ones. If the sponsoring creditor's own decision in
favor of the merits of a workout is a close call-and in many cases it
will be-predicting the actions of the other creditors presents the
greatest hazard of all.
To the extent that the presumption in favor of the zero-sum model
controls, it contributes significantly to understanding creditors' failure
to exert greater effort on behalf of workouts in cases where a workout
might enhance their recoveries. If creditors view the contest not as one
of Creditor's Dilemma but as a zero-sum game, they have no incentive
to seek mutual cooperation.
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The earlier analysis of factors that defeated Kelly's attempt at a
workout, one that did not directly invoke the insights of game theory,
reached the same conclusion as the foregoing exploration of collection
practices that result from misapplication of the zero-sum model.
Competition among creditors presents the central problem to overcoming
overly coercive methods of collection. Moreover, the need to successfully compete accounts for the dilemma faced by creditors without a
cooperative solution to contests that they do recognize as ones of
Creditor's Dilemma.
Applying game theory, both the zero-sum game and the Prisoner's
Dilemma, to collection cases does more than reinforce the conclusion
reached previously in the analysis of Kelly's case. Recognizing
creditors' contests as flawed or pure games of Prisoner's Dilemma
provides the foundation for exploring solutions to creditors' problems
in the larger context of applied game theory's concern with securing
beneficial cooperative action in all instances in which the need for
cooperative action may arise. Before summarizing, however, these
solutions to the generalized problem of collective choice, another type
of creditor misperception of the collection setting deserves recognition
for the important role it plays in thwarting beneficial collective action
by creditors.
The universe of a creditor's perception of any given collection case
is not limited to a choice of the zero-sum or Prisoner's Dilemma
models. If there are instances in which a creditor uses coercion because
she believes the debtor will soon fall, and she wishes to reap a larger
share than her fellow creditors of the limited assets that will be devoted
to payment of the debtor's obligations, there are also other instances,
probably more numerous in the early stages of the collection process, in
which a creditor does not perceive her employment of coercive measures
as visiting any harm on her fellow creditors. If a debtor has just
commenced his slide into profligacy, firm demands, even legal action,
by a collector may provide the impetus to turn the debtor around, not
only to the benefit of the disciplining creditor but to that of the debtor's
other creditors as well.6 9
Certainly, initial collection efforts often must be guided by the
presumption of a need to instill financial discipline in the debtor. Here
too, the manner of doing so is not to indulge the debtor's requests for
extensions but to demand that defaults be promptly cured. 0 Thus, even

69. Cf. 4 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937) (1776) (observing that, by operation
of the "invisible hand," a self interested action can benefit persons other than the actor).
70. See COLE, supra note 47, at 371.
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before the creditor knows that she is engaged in a contest with other
creditors, a pattern of coercive collection often has been established, one
which may later bias the creditor toward applying even more stringent
coercive strategies based on the model of a zero-sum game.
Any compendium of the possible misperceptions of a Creditor's
Dilemma as an activity not involving a contest with other creditors
would be incomplete without one further recognition. In some instances,
but probably not many, the creditor's mistaken assessment may lead to
her erroneous employment of a cooperative strategy. Creditors often
make extensions of consumer debts without regard to whether other
creditors are adjusting the terms of their loans. This action will prove
advantageous to the creditor granting the extension, as well as the
debtor, if the latter's financial condition is not such as to preclude the
debtor's financial recovery without concessions from his other creditors.
In a case in which the cooperation of more than one of the debtor's
principal creditors is required to avert financial failure, a creditor who
mistakenly grants an extension when others do not is vulnerable to their
employment of coercive strategies. While asymmetries of information
and mistaken judgments may result in some creditors making this error,
it seems probable in most cases that by the time the debtor is in serious
default, all creditors will perceive the matter as a collection contest and
employ coercive strategies as predicted by the preceding analyses of
Creditor's Dilemma and zero-sum games.
Ill. RESOLVING THE CREDITOR'S DILEMMA

A. The Emergence of Consumer Credit Counseling
Agencies as Major Participantsin Resolving
Consumer Debt Problems
In my analysis in Games Creditors Play, placing creditors on the
playing fields of game theory does more than reinforce conclusions
regarding creditor behavior reached independently by earlier recognition
of the race-of-diligence motive for coercive collection. Use of the
Prisoner's Dilemma framework serves an additional and equally
important function. Analysts who recognize creditors as participants in
Prisoner's Dilemmas have a broader base for examining remedial
measures than those analysts who fail to generalize the creditors'
problem. Once the problem of securing beneficial collective action by
creditors is recognized as a subset of a broader issue-the problem of
obtaining collective action in all the social, economic and political
contexts in which joint participation by individuals is required to achieve
a common goal-the basis exists for exploring solutions to the narrower
issue by applying the revelations of theorists studying the broader one.
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The insights of these theorists contribute to an understanding of why
a systematic resolution of the Creditor's Dilemma, outside of bankruptcy
proceedings, has required the fashioning of unique private-sector
instrumentalities-non-profit consumer credit counseling agencies
affiliated with the National Foundation for Consumer Credit. These
agencies, which exist throughout this country and are now accessible to
most Americans, obtain needed extensions in the debtor's payment terms
in instances in which both creditors and the debtor are likely to benefit
from the extensions. I focus on the work of the non-profit counseling
agencies because of the extent of their operations, their dramatic growth
rate, the relative uniformity of their operations, and the availability of
information concerning them. The first of these non-profit agencies
formed with the support of creditors appeared in this country only some
four decades ago.
By early 1996, consumer credit counseling offices of agencies
affiliated with the National Foundation for Consumer Credit were
located in nearly 1200 cities and towns in the United States and Canada,
having increased six-fold from only some 200 locations in only 12
years.' Many of these offices perform credit counseling only, while
others are part of multi-service agencies such as Family Services or
Catholic Charities.' Officials of the National Foundation for Consumer
Credit estimate that 90% of the U.S. population now has reasonable
access to a main or branch credit counseling office.Y These officials
estimate that during 1996 over 1.8 million debtors will contact member
counseling agencies for assistance in avoiding bankruptcy and that those
agencies will counsel 972,000 of those debtors.74 Of those counseled,
34% will be assisted by the implementation of debt management plans
in which the agencies persuade creditors to extend payment terms,
disburse the debtor's payments to creditors, and otherwise administer the
workouts they sponsor.7 Another 34% will be instructed by the
agencies in self-help through learning budgeting skills.7 6 An additional
25% will be advised that some additional measure such as obtaining

71. Durant Abernathy, National Foundation for Consumer Credit, Bankruptcy Trends and
Alternatives (Nov. 1996) (presentation at CCUL Annual Meeting & Convention, on file with
author); Telephone interview with Bill Furmanski, Director of Communications of National
Foundation for Consumer Credit and Melony Branbon, Assistant to the President of the National
Foundation for Consumer Credit (Dec. 5, 1996) [Abernathy presentation and interview with
Furmanski and Branbon together hereinafter NFCC].
72. NFCC, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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additional income through another job will be required before a debt
management plan will be feasible.' The remaining 7% will seek relief
through bankruptcy.78 The 972,000 debtors that will be counseled in
1996 are a substantial increase in the 254,000 counseled only eight years
earlier in 1988."9 Moreover, according to the data provided by the
National Foundation, the number of debtors seeking the services of
credit counseling offices during this eight-year period has grown at a
faster rate than that of debtors seeking relief in bankruptcy, where
526,000 petitions were filed in 1988 and some 1.1 million are expected
to be filed in 1996.80 Finally, active debt management plans administered by the agencies have grown dramatically in number and dollars
returned to creditors in recent years.8 The 418,000 active debt management plans administered by the agencies in 1996 is a dramatic increase
from the 49,739 active plans they administered in 1983, and the dollars
returned to creditors from those plans has increased 242 million in 1987
to an estimated 1.575 billion in 1996.82
As the foregoing data reveal, in many instances consumer credit
counseling agencies need provide no further assistance to debtors than
helping them establish workable budgets. The description that follows,
however, focuses on the additional task that data revealed the agencies
perform when dealing with more seriously troubled debtors, those for
whom budgeting alone is inadequate.
In this role, the agencies obtain creditors' acquiescence to plans that
extend the debtor's time for payment. The extensions must be necessary
for the debtor's rehabilitation, and the debtor's proposed performance
under the plan must be feasible. Counseling agencies only attempt
extension plans after the debtor and counselor have fully explored the
debtor's financial affairs and have determined that payment of all but
long-term debt, such as the debtor's home mortgage and sometimes his
car note, can be made over a period that typically does not exceed four
years. The agency will sponsor the workout only when the counselor
believes that the debtor is committed to the plan and able to live within
its confines.
Counseling agencies also administer the plans they sponsor. This
duty includes disbursing the debtor's payments to creditors and
monitoring the performance of the parties. The debtor must fund the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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plan as agreed, although counselors will work further with debtors who
fall behind in payments so long as they think these debtors are seriously
committed to the workout. Creditors must not undermine the workout
by continuing their individual recovery efforts.
The distinctive feature of credit counseling as a private-sector remedy
is that it accomplishes its functions within the severe cost constraints
that distinguish most consumer collection cases from large commercial
ones. By working with distressed debtors day in and day out, credit
counselors hone their skills in assessing whether debtors need extensions
and whether they will use them to increase the aggregate recovery of
theii creditors. The repetitive nature of the credit counselor's work
provides the specialization and division of labor upon which economies
of scale are often based. By also working with the principal creditors in
the community on a daily basis, the counseling agency acquires the trust
and confidence of those creditors in the agency's role as monitor of the
performance of the debtor and creditors in a workout. In this latter
function, economies of scale are most significant because, once a
creditor's trust is established, the cost of securing her cooperation in
subsequent cases is greatly reduced.
The affiliation of counseling agencies with the National Foundation
for Consumer Credit further extends these economies of scale. A newly
formed agency that has received the approval of the National Foundation
may trade on the goodwill of long existing agencies in establishing its
own reputation. Established agencies dealing with geographically remote
creditors may trade on the reputations of agencies that operate in that
creditor's usual trade area.
B. Contrasting Workouts Under Consumer Credit Counseling
Plans with Bankruptcy Proceedings .
Creditor cooperation, which consumer credit counseling agencies
effect by earning the confidence of creditors, may be provided simply
and certainly with cost-effectiveness by governmental edict. The
automatic stay of any action by individual creditors to collect their
claims other than by proceedings in the bankruptcy court, which is
imposed upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy,83 is a clear
recognition by lawmakers of the benefits that may be derived from
substituting collective for individual creditor action at that point in the
collection process. Yet creditors do not feel their interests are typically
as fairly treated in bankruptcy proceedings as they are in counselorassisted workouts, and I believe they harbor this belief for good reasons.

83. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
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Because bankruptcy law protects creditors in various ways, creditors'
belief that credit counseling provides a more palatable alternative to
them, and to debtors who wish to pay their obligations, than bankruptcy
as often practiced in this country warrants further examination. I turn to
the provisions of first Chapter 7 and then Chapter 13 that attempt to
equitably balance the rights of debtors and creditors.
First, the gates to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code are no longer
open to just any debtor who comes calling. Creditors are probably most
offended by those Chapter 7 cases in which a debtor with income in
excess of reasonable current living expenses receives a discharge upon
surrendering nonexempt assets of little value to his creditors.84 As
creditors count primarily on a consumer debtor's regular income and not
liquidation of assets of little market value, creditors and some theorists
have argued that debtors with significant disposable incomes should be
required to commit at least some of their future income to the payment
of creditors as the price of their discharge.85 This principle is now
reflected in a provision of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code that
empowers the bankruptcy court "on its own motion or on a motion by
the United States trustee" to dismiss a voluntary Chapter 7 case filed by
an individual "whose debts are primarily consumer debts" upon a
finding of "substantial abuse" of the provisions of Chapter 7.86 While
the vague statutory standard of "substantial abuse" does not expressly
incorporate a test based on the ability of the debtor to make substantial
payments from future income, a significant number of judicial decisions
applying the standard have imposed that test.8 7 However, the standard
is admittedly vague, and survey results reveal significant disparity in the
frequency of use of substantial-abuse motions by various bankruptcy
judges and U.S. Trustees. 8
When a debtor loses access to Chapter 7, however, she is not
precluded from filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. But bankruptcy
law provides some protection of even unsecured creditors in Chapter 13

84. See ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D.

WARREN, BANKRUPTCY

670 (4th ed. 1995).

85. See Theodore Eisenberg, BankruptcyLaw in Perspective,28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 980
(1981) ("Repayment plans that draw upon future earnings more accurately reflect a debtor's
ability to pay than do liquidation plans. We live to a great extent in a cash flow world.").
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
87. See, e.g., In re Walton, 866 E2d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 1989); Zolg v. Kelly, 841 F.2d
908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988). While these cases hold that a debtor's income in excess of expenses,
standing alone, constitutes a substantial abuse of Chapter 7 justifying dismissal, Green v. Staples,
934 E2d 568, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1991), holds that the debtor's ability to repay is the primary but
not sole factor to be considered in applying the "substantial abuse" test.
88. Wayne R. Wells et al., The Implementation of Bankruptcy Code Section 707(b): The
Law and the Reality, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 15, 42 (1991).
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cases. While unsecured creditors as a class or classes do not get to vote
on confirmation of a plan in Chapter 13 as they do in a business
reorganization in Chapter 11, they are protected by the requirement that
the plan must be proposed in "good faith" and, further, by the "best
interests" test that requires each creditor receives at least as much as she
would have received in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy of the debtor.8 9 Of
greater significance, however, is that since 1984 Chapter 13 has
provided that any unsecured creditor may block confirmation of a plan
that provides for less than full payment of her claim, unless "the plan
provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be
received in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first
payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under
the plan."' For the purpose of applying the rule, the term "disposable
income," means, in the context of a consumer debtor, "income which is
received.., by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be
expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor."9 '
Thus, it may appear that even unsecured creditors in Chapter 13
cases, while not necessarily being promised payment in full, receive in
one important sense the equivalent of what they get in counselor-assisted
workouts. Arguably, creditors in both instances get the best the debtor
can do in a long period-three years in Chapter 13 and 4 years in
workouts-of curtailing expenses in order to pay obligations. Yet if the
protection of creditor interests is essentially equal, my conclusion that
creditors perceive Chapter 13 as less protective of their interests than
counselor-assisted workouts is either erroneous or inexplicable. There
are, however, differences between the two methods that explain the
better treatment accorded creditors by counselor-assisted workouts.
The two types of collective undertakings first vary in the degree of
commitment a debtor must bring to each. Under the bankruptcy
standard, what is necessary for the support of the debtor and his
dependents is a flexible standard. While there are doubtlessly some
bankruptcy judges who apply that test in a manner that requires the
debtor's maximum commitment to payment of his debts in a Chapter 13
plan, there probably are a large number of others who apply a far less
stringent standard. One bankruptcy judge who conversed with me on the

89. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), (4) (1994).
90. Id. § 1325(b)(1). To the extent that a creditor holds a secured claim, see id.§ 506(a),
he is protected in any case in which the debtor retains his collateral by the requirement that the
plan provide for retention of his lien and for payments, having a value as of the effective date

of the plan, of the amount of his secured claim. See a § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).
91. Id. § 1325(b)(2)(A).
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subject of credit counseling agencies concluded unequivocally that the
agencies were not needed in his district as the Chapter 13 plans that he
confirmed were fully protective of creditors' claims. There are probably
wide differences in the standards that are imposed on Chapter 13 plans
by the various bankruptcy judges, and consequently, like divergences in
creditors' views of the efficacy of Chapter 13 actions.'
In comparison, a debtor in a workout and his credit counselor must
fashion a plan for full payment of all claims. In Games CreditorsPlay,
I conclude that creditors limit counselors to extension plans, rather than
also authorize them to propose compositions in which reductions in
obligations will be given if the plan is completed, because doing so
considerably limits creditors' costs of monitoring the cost of their
monitor, the credit counselor. Regardless of the reason for this limitation
on the function of credit counseling, however, debtors whose objective
is full payment of their claims must be far more apt to curtail their
living expenses and perhaps moonlight to increase their income than
Chapter 13 debtors. The latter need only meet a test of the reasonableness of their living expenses and are subject to that lesser standard for
a period that may be one year less than they would encounter in a
workout. Given the greater incentive of a debtor in a workout to effect
full payment-unlike Chapter 13 proceedings his debts are discharged
only if he does so 93---creditors justifiably perceive workouts, where
feasible, as preferable to Chapter 13 plans.
Other reasons justify the distinction creditors make between workouts
and Chapter 13 proceedings. The statute requiring that all the debtor's
disposable income be directed to payments under the Chapter 13 plan94
may produce little for unsecured creditors if the debtor directs that
income in large part to payments on secured claims.
That statute does not restrict the debtor from doing so, and another
provision of the Bankruptcy Code permits Chapter 13 plans to "provide
for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance
of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or
secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which
the final payment under the plan is due."95 Chapter 13 encourages
debtors to channel their contributions to the plan toward payments on
92. Compare 5 LAWRENCE KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 1325.08[4][b][ii] (15th ed.

1992) (concluding that a judge's determination of the debtor's disposable income should not
mandate drastic changes in the debtor's lifestyle) with In re Kitson, 65 B.R. 615, 622 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1986) ("A Chapter 13 debtor who proposes to pay his creditors 38 cents on the dollar
cannot expect to 'go first class' when 'coach' is available.").
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1994) (providing for the discharge of debts under Chapter 13).
94. See id. § 1325(b).
95. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
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these long-term debts, which are usually secured by the debtor's home,
because Chapter 13 excepts such long-term debts from its discharge.96
Secured creditors whose claims are payable before the expiration of the
term of the Chapter 13 plan will not have their debts excepted from
discharge. When the debtor retains the collateral, however, those secured
creditors may exact a promise of payments having a value, as of the
effective day of the plan, of the amount of their secured claims.97
Typically, the debtor's need and desire to retain his home, automobile, boat, or other encumbered property will dictate that his plan
provide for payments to secured creditors--catching up on arrearages
and then staying current on these obligations-at the expense of
unsecured creditors. The result of these provisions is that in spite of the
disposable income test, a Chapter 13 plan may be confirmed that
provides for no payment to unsecured creditors.98 A statistical study
showing that Chapter 13 debtors had considerably more secured and less
unsecured debt than Chapter 7 debtors99 evinces that some consumers
may be attracted to Chapter 13 not to increase the recovery of their
unsecured creditors but to retain encumbered property that they might
lose in a Chapter 7 proceeding.
Unsecured creditors fall far short of full recovery of their claims in
Chapter 13 despite the disposable income test. Researchers have found
that average proposed payments range from about one-third to one-half
of unsecured claims. Moreover, in only about one-third of the Chapter
13 cases do debtors complete payments of what was promised in the
plan."° Workouts sponsored by consumer credit counseling agencies
propose full payment to creditors and have a higher success rate. The
National Foundation for Consumer Credit reports that 25% of their debt
management plans are completed and another 22% become selfadministering when it is felt that there is no further need for the use of
the counseling agency as intermediary between the debtor and her credi96. See id. §§ 1328(a)(1), (c)(1), 1322(b)(5).
97. See id. § 1325(a)(5) (protecting liens of secured parties in Chapter 13).
98. See In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that absence of
payments to unsecured creditors did not disqualify Chapter 13 plan where husband and wife codebtors had a sizeable arrearage to occur on their home mortgage and chose to retain their two
automobiles by making installment payments on their debts secured by the vehicles). But the
Bankruptcy Code also requires that Chapter 13 plans be proposed in "good faith," see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(3) (1994), and some bankruptcy judges have denied confirmation of plans providing
for no payments to unsecured creditors on that basis. See, e.g., In re Lattimore, 69 B.R. 622,
625-26 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987).
99. See Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An
Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 36 (1987).
100. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS

438 (1996).
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tors."° ' Counseling agencies close debt management plans for failure
of the debtor to perform in 48% of their cases, and debtors leave
counseling agencies for bankruptcy courts in the remaining 5% of debt
management plans."°
In counselor-assisted workouts, a secured creditor does not normally
extend terms of payment, for doing so while depreciation of collateral
goes unchecked, would diminish the value of that collateral relative to
the amount of the claim. In this manner, creditors participating in
workouts recognize the bankruptcy principle of adequate protection of
secured claims, whereby creditors in reorganizations of business entities
may be entitled to periodic payments that equal the depreciation on their
collateral during the period between filing the bankruptcy petition and
confirmation of the plan or dismissal of the case. 3 In counselorassisted workouts, the cost of this practice to unsecured creditors is
limited by the requirement that the plan provide for payment of their
claims in full. While unsecured creditors in these workouts suffer further
delays to accommodate the debtor's needs to bring and keep payments
on secured claims current, the promise of ultimate payment on their
claims may not be a casualty of those needs.
Unsecured creditors also prefer a workout to bankruptcy because they
will benefit from the absence of attorney's fees and court costs. These
costs are borne by creditors except where the debtor's friend or relative
pays these costs or where the debtor uses property that would not have
funded a Chapter 13 plan," would not have been distributed to
creditors in a Chapter 7 plan, 5 or would not have been used for prepetition payments to creditors. Even though credit counseling agencies
generally succeed in their efforts to get creditors for whom they collect
to defray their cost of operation-a charge of some 12 percent on
collections is commonly touted as the creditor's "fair share"-workouts
commonly entail lower costs than attorney's fees and court costs in a
bankruptcy proceeding."'°

101. See NFCC, supra note 71.
102. See id.
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994). Methods other than periodic payments to defray
depreciation exist, such as providing the secured creditor additional collateral.
104. Chapter 13 plans are generally funded by the debtor's salary or wages earned after the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Bankruptcy Code's general provisions define property of

the estate primarily in terms of the debtor's prepetition property. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (1994).
To accomplish its goal, Chapter 13 supplements these general provisions by including the
debtor's postpetition property including earnings as property of the estate. See id. § 1306.
105. In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the debtor retains his exempt property. See id. § 522.
106. Large creditors in a community also will support their local credit counseling agency
by donations of money and in-kind contributions such as office space or equipment. While this
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A final reason that unsecured creditors prefer counselor-assisted
workouts to Chapter 13 actions is based not on differences in the
recovery of principal but on a principle that creditors share: participation
in debt adjustment by consent is generally preferable to participation by
governmental command. In the closest parallel to debt adjustment in
Chapter 13, a business reorganization in Chapter 11, unsecured creditors
as a class do have a say in approving the plan." No similar provision
in Chapter 13, however, gives unsecured creditors, even by class, a
negotiating stance in the formulation of the plan.' Chapter 13 does
provide that the court may not confirm a plan unless it provides for
payments to each unsecured creditor that have a present value not less
than the amount that creditor would have received if the eftate of the
debtor had been liquidated in Chapter 7' This provision, however,
gives unsecured creditors little bargaining strength because Chapter 7
bankruptcies by consumer debtors often produce little or nothing for
unsecured creditors.
In contrasting the treatment of creditors in counselor-assisted
workouts with their treatment in Chapter 13 proceedings, attention also
must be given to secured creditors in the two proceedings. While
debtors, as noted earlier, may channel the disposable income they are
required to commit to their Chapter 13 plans to their secured creditors
in order to retain encumbered property, it does not follow that secured
creditors do better or even as well in a Chapter 13 proceeding as they
do in a counselor-assisted workout.
While a secured creditor is entitled to payments under the Chapter
13 plan in the amount of his secured claim plus interest over the life of
the plan,"0 the amount of the secured claim, a defined term in bankruptcy, cannot exceed the value of the collateral."' Hence, where the
value of the collateral, as determined by the bankruptcy court, is less
than the amount of the creditor's claim, the debtor may retain the
collateral by proposing amortization of the lesser amount plus interest
thereon in payments under the plan.

support increases the costs to the donors of counselor-assisted workouts, it also testifies to the

value they believe they receive from the work of the counseling agency.
107. See id. § 1129(a)(8). While a Chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection
of a class of unsecured creditors by resort to "cramdown," see id. § 1129(b)(2)(B), the proponent
of the plan typically will find it advantageous to seek confirmation by negotiation, see Richard
F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39
Bus. LAW. 441,453-54 (1984).
108. See id. § 1325 (listing the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan).
109. See id. § 1325(a)(4).
110. See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
111. See id. § 506(a).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss4/3

44

Cotter:
Interests
COLLECTION
OF Conflicting
CONSUMER DEBT

in Trade Secrets

A restriction on this right of the Chapter 13 debtor to modify secured
claims protects the mortgagee of the debtor's home from this "lien
stripping.""' 2 But security interests in motor vehicles, boats, furniture,
appliances, and other personal property may be reduced to the courtdetermined value of the collateral, protecting secured creditor status only
to the extent of that value. The balance of the creditor's claim is treated
as an unsecured one. The partial stripping of a creditor's lien in Chapter
13 is a more effective device for debtors than a similar provision limited
to certain tangible personal property in Chapter 7 because the latter
provision requires that the debtor make a lump-sum payment of the
value of the collateral to redeem it." 3 In contrast to the treatment of
secured creditors in bankruptcy, secured creditors in counselor-assisted
workouts may insist on their state law rights to receive full payment of
their claims before loss of their security interests.
The foregoing analysis of why creditors prefer counselor-assisted
workouts to Chapter 13 proceedings does not mean, however, that
creditors reject any meaningful role for Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceedings in protecting their interests. To the contrary, the consumercredit industry has worked diligently to promote the use of Chapter 13
over Chapter 7, and its lobby was influential in imposing the "substantial-abuse" test previously examined on access to Chapter 7V Where
full payment of claims in a counselor-assisted workout is not feasible
and a Chapter 13 plan holds the promise of greater recovery than
Chapter 7 or the running of the creditors' race of diligence, Chapter 13
creditors will perceive Chapter 13 as providing the best basis for the
collection of their claims.
The important role that creditors recognize for Chapter 13 does not
detract, however, from the role they assign the credit counselor.
Creditors perceive a hierarchy of need by troubled debtors, extending
from those who may still make full payments with the assistance of a
counseling agency, to those who require a scaledown of their debts in
a Chapter 13, to those for whom even serious effort at meaningful
payment from future income will be fruitless (the proper candidates in
creditors' estimation for Chapter 7 bankruptcies).
In stating the case for credit counseling agencies, I have focused on
the role they play in a collection process that otherwise provides no
systematic means to obtain collective action when bankruptcy may still
be avoided. Systematic solutions are particularly needed in consumer-

112. See id. § 1322(b)(2); Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1993).
113. See id. § 722; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 E2d 1053, 1055 (6th
Cir. 1983).
114. See JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 84, at 672-74.
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collection cases because these solutions make transaction costs, which
must be tightly contained in these cases, manageable.
Like off-the-rack suits, however, the use of a credit-counseling
agency does not always provide a good fit with creditors' and debtors'
needs. For example, creditors may be harmed when a credit counselor
procures extensions that do not produce increased recovery of their
claims but are used by the debtor to forestall the individual collection
efforts creditors would otherwise make. This type of counselor's error
may also increase the cost of the counselor's services, and thus the costs
of the collection process, in subsequent cases. Too many disappointing
recoveries will undermine a creditor's confidence in the counselor's
judgment. This may result in the counselor encountering greater
difficulty in getting that creditor to forego coercive collection measures
in later cases when the implementation of workout plans is clearly
justified. Nevertheless, the growth of credit counseling evinces that this
is not a serious problem. In large numbers, creditors, especially
experienced ones, accept the work of counseling agencies and will assist
those agencies in securing the cooperation of other creditors who
initially fail to acquiesce in workout plans.
The remedy that counseling agencies offer also may fail in some
instances to meet the needs of debtors who use it. A debtor who opts for
a counselor-assisted workout without properly assessing the difficulties
that the workout will entail may be better advised to file a Chapter 13
or even Chapter 7 bankruptcy action. I have talked with bankruptcy
attorneys and one prolific commentator on bankruptcy law who believe
that agencies that are supported by creditors are not sensitive enough to
the needs of debtors. Their complaint is the converse of that of creditors
who believe that attorneys channel many consumers into bankruptcy
when workouts would be feasible and advantageous to the debtor as
well as her creditors. Doubtlessly, there is some truth in the charges of
both groups, and turf battles are bound to arise in those cases in which
a good argument can be made for either form of relief.
There are unquestionably instances in which a counselor sponsors a
plan that a better informed debtor would not have undertaken. Such
plans will often be aborted, imposing additional costs on both the debtor
and his creditors. Moreover, even when these plans are fully performed,
they may impose costs on the debtor that transcend all benefits the
debtor derives.
One such cost of the use of credit counseling agencies is a psychic
one some debtors suffer from having to forego the sole management of
their financial affairs. This factor is probably most acutely felt by
prudent, well-educated people whose overextensions are the result of
non-volitional expenditures or sudden losses of income and not
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mismanagement of debt. To avoid this humbling experience, some
people will forego the use of a counseling agency and attempt to
personally obtain their creditors' support for a workout. While many are
likely successful, their task is typically made far more difficult by their
failure to invoke the assistance of a credit counseling agency.
The costs to a debtor of entering into a counselor-assisted workout
will exceed the benefits only when the debtor significantly underestimates the hardship the workout will entail. If the debtor's estimate of
the hardship is more accurate, the fact that the debtor undertakes the
workout when many other people similarly situated would choose
bankruptcy is of no moment. The debtor is best able to assess his own
costs. A debtor's taste for difficult workouts is entitled to the same
respect as a taste for boiled okra or sushi.
It is all too easy to exaggerate the imperfections in the counselorassisted workout method of systematic debt adjustment. Notwithstanding
imperfections, credit counseling works better than any other method in
cases that fall within its domain. As noted above, the remedy may cause
harm to a debtor, her creditors, or both when it is applied to a case in
which it affords no clear gain to one or both of them. The credit
counseling system has, however, a significant safeguard built in to
prevent its misapplication. Counselors are sufficiently motivated to
objectively assess the probability of a successful workout and to decline
those cases where the probability seems remote. They lose credibility
with the creditors and debtors they serve, and could lose their jobs,
when they sponsor too many unsuccessful cases.
From the perspective of creditors, a case is not necessarily unsuccessful if the debtor fails to make full payment of his obligations under
the plan. If the counseling plan recovers an amount greater than the
probable recovery from any other manner of collection, the failed plan
is still a relative success for creditors. As reflected earlier in the payoff
matrix for the Creditor's Dilemma, the probable benefits that justify
concerted action by creditors in workouts will never accurately reflect
full payment of claims because no means of collection is riskless.
One has more difficulty, however, in finding benefit to a debtor in
a plan that is not completed, and here critics of counselor-assisted
workouts may have cause for concern. A debtor who must seek relief
in bankruptcy following an unsuccessful attempt at a workout probably
has not enhanced his credit rating by the failed workout. Except to the
extent that the debtor values his efforts to avoid bankruptcy, he will
obtain no benefit from those efforts.
Perhaps the best answer to this criticism of counselor-assisted
workouts is that any opportunity entails risks that should be carefully
weighed against potential benefits. The debtor makes the final decision
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to undertake the workout. Credit counselors in non-profit agencies have
no financial or other incentive to encourage plans that are beyond the
debtor's abilities. A credit counselor may be motivated to sponsor less
than promising cases if his job is threatened by a declining case load,
but this problem is more theoretical than real so long as counselors, like
bankruptcy lawyers, are employed in a growth industry. As a
counselor's job is made considerably harder by sponsoring a plan that
exceeds the debtor's abilities, any deviation by the counselor from a
purely objective assessment of the debtor's probability of successfully
completing the plan is likely to be one that prejudices the counselor
against taking the case, not one that encourages a debtor's quixotic
endeavor.
C. Some Abbreviated Ramifications of the Resolution
of the Creditors' Dilemma
From the perspective of how counselor-assisted workouts and
Chapter 13 bankruptcy are often used in this country, counselor-assisted
workouts serve a different purpose for a different constituency than debt
adjustments in Chapter 13. Such workouts differ even more materially
from the use of proceeds from the sale of nonexempt assets to make
payment of creditors' claims that occurs in Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings.
No serious effort previously has been made to normatively evaluate
consumer collection law and practice from a perspective that recognizes
the emergence of counseling agencies as major participants in addressing
the problems of overextension. No attempt to set the boundaries of
permissible creditors' remedies and collection practices should fail to
address the impact of the work of these agencies in thwarting counterproductive collection effort.
Avoiding costs to debtors that are not perceived as resulting in
corresponding gains to their creditors and therefore avoiding "lost value"
has long been the primary, albeit often dubious argument for banning
various creditors' remedies. The principal attacks on these remedies are
explored in some detail in Games Creditors Play. The lost-value
premise has been scrutinized and found wanting in various respects by
theorists, whose analyses I review in that book, but examination of the
work done by credit counselors reveals an additional reason for
stemming the attack on creditors' remedies. Counselor-assisted workouts
block the counterproductive use of these remedies in instances in which
bankruptcy is not desired or needed. Moreover, the protection afforded
by the availability of credit-counseling services provides a strong
impetus for reexamining laws, often longstanding ones, that generously
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exempt certain property from the reach of remedies that creditors could
otherwise successfully employ.
Adding the credit counseling alternative to traditional means of
addressing the problem of overextension in a Chapter 7 or 13 bankruptcy action gives debtors a suitable device to block counterproductive
collection practices in all the various stages of overextension in which
they may find themselves. They may use counselor-assisted workouts
when full payment of all claims over an extended time is feasible, and
one of the two forms of consumer bankruptcy when it is not. The ability
of debtors to employ these procedures to block creditors' use of coercive
remedies undercuts the argument of some lawmakers and commentators
that banning certain of these remedies would ensure that they are not
used in instances in which they are perceived as inflicting greater harm
on debtors than benefit to creditors.
For debtors with the ability to make payments on their obligations
who fail to do so, creditors need effective remedies to reduce the costs
and increase the availability of credit and to clearly signal that Americans respect the principle of honoring commitment. Recognizing that the
majority of overextensions are primarily due to non-volitional expenses
or interruptions of income beyond the debtor's control does not militate
against providing creditors effective remedies to use against debtors who
fail to make payment when they are able to do so. Nor does enforcement of market obligations further only materialistic values. While
pursuit of the frills of the marketplace may blind us to higher cultural,
intellectual, and spiritual values, loss of respect for commitment to
market obligation may erode these higher values as well as the
fundamental tenet upon which our credit economy is based.
The argument for giving creditors more effective remedies against
debtors who stonewall their collection efforts is not meant to impugn,
however, the need for bankruptcy relief in the many cases of overwhelming indebtedness that arise in this country. Whether these cases
result from interrupted income, non-volitional expenses, or financial
mismanagement, more than loss of the impetus for future economic
effort on the part of the debtor can result from the bondage of previously incurred debt. We are more than mere economic actors and need
freedom from income-generating activity to pursue other aspects of our
being.
In cases in which the debtor's plight is serious but not hopeless,
however, the arguments in favor of bankruptcy relief must be carefully
balanced with those previously made for enforcing an obligation. Doing
what we promised another, even when it is difficult to do so, does more
than benefit the workings of markets. A higher value is at stake. Paying
market debt is one of the most common forms of honoring the timeless
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religious, moral, and humanistic principle of treating our neighbors as
we would have our neighbor treat us. While that principle encompasses
the forgiveness of debt as well as honoring it, a proper balance of these
opposing aspects of the same principle requires that those whose debts
are forgiven first exert good faith efforts to meet them.
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